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Case No. 20150123-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.
ROBBIE MICHAEL MACDONALD,
Defendant/Appellee.

Reply Brief of Appellant
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised·in the appellee's brief.

ARGUMENT

I.
Police were not required to give Miranda w·arnings
because Defendant was not in custody, but police did
so anyway, and Defendant waived his rights.
As discussed in the State's opening brief, Defendant was not in custody during the first station house interview on January 18, 2013, nor was
he in custody during the second station house interview five days later, on
January 23, 2013. Aplt.Brf. 22-28. Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that officers were subject to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). And as discussed, the officers in this case complied with
the Miranda requirements in any event. Aplt.Brf. 28-38. Defendant makes

two arguments that merit the State's further response: (1) that in reviewing
the trial court's Miranda decision, the appellate court may not consider unchallenged record evidence if it did not appear in the trial court's factual
findings, Aple.Brf. 11-13; and (2) that the standard for determining custody
for purposes of Miranda is whether a suspect' s freedom of movement is restricted, Aplt.Brf. 14-18. Both arguments lack merit.

A. This Court's review of the trial court's Miranda decision properly includes consideration of the trial
court's factual findings and other relevant, unchallenged record facts.
Defendant contends that an appellant may not rely on evidence in the
record unless the trial court made specific factual findings on that evidence.
Aple.Brf. 11-13. He thus argues that the State in its brief improperly relies
on evidence found in the record but not included in the trial court's factual
findings. Aple.Brf. 11-12. Defendant argues that when an appellant relies on
evidence that does not make its way into the trial court's factual findings, he
in essence is making a challenge to the trial court's factual findings, which,
in turn, requires preservation and a showing of clear error. This is not the
law. And Defendant has cited noth~ng to support such a proposition.
When reviewing a decision that includes "essentially undisputed"
facts, this Court reviews "the trial court's Findings of Fact as supplemented by

[a] review of the record." State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 540 n.1 (Utah App.
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· 1997) (emphasis added); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36~ ,r2, 78 P.3d 590
(" supplement[ing] the trial court's findings of fact with ·i:-~levant ·testimony
.

- .

.

given··: .. during an evidentiary hearing"). Indeed,· the United States Supreme Court has specifically held that when addressing constitutional challenges, courts look not only to the trial court's factual findings, but also to
the unchallenged evidence in the record:
While this Court does not sit as in nisi prius to appraise contradictory factual questions, it will, where necessary to the determination of constitutional rights, make an independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record so that it can determine for itself whether in the decision ... the fundamentali.e., constitutional-criteria established by this Court have been
respected.

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
Defendant takes issue with four record facts cited by the State in its
brief that were not included in the trial court's factual findings:
• "MacDonald was never restrained or placed in handcuffs,"
• "the detectives were unarmed and in plain clothes,"
• "MacDonald was never deprived of food or water," and
e

"MacDonald had his cell phone with him during the second interview."

Aple.Brf. 11-12 (quoting Aplt.Brf. 26-27). But none of these record facts were
in dispu~e.
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In Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police, Defendant ditj. not claim that he was restraine_d or handcuffed by police. He conceded t~at he was not-in both his motion, R289 (acknowledging that "Defendant was not restrained in handcuffs or told he was under arrest"), and
at the hearing, R1201:32 (admitting that "he was not in handcuffs"). And the
video recordings of the interviews showed that he was not restrained in any
way. See SE3-4. Defendant did not claim that he was deprived of food or
water. See R287-93. For good reason-the video recordings showed that he
was not. See SE3-4. And the video recording of the first interview showed
that Defendant in fact had a water bottle with him throughout. See SE3. Defendant did not clahn that his questioners were armed or uniformed. Again
for good reason- the video recordings showed that his questioners were
~earing plain clothes and were not armed. See SE3-4. Nor did Defendant
dispute the fact that he had his cell phone with him during the second interview. R287-93. Again, the video recording made that plain. SE4:1:12:10.
In sum, the foregoing record facts were not in dispute. Accordingly, it
is appropriate for this Court to examine those facts in assessing whether the
trial court's decision on the constitutional issue of Miranda was correct. See

Ker, 374 at 34.
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B. A determination of custody under Miranda not only
requires a finding that the suspect's freedom of
movement is restricted, but also a finding that the restriction is akin to arrest-that was not the case here.
According to Defendant, the State "acknowledges that the relevant
standard for determining whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is whether, in light of the objective circumstances of interrogation, a
reasonable person would have felt he was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Aple.Brf. 14 (citing Aplt.Brf. 23 and Howes v. Fields,
132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012)). But the State did not acknowledge that such is
the standard for custody, and-Fields does not identify that as the standard.
Defendant leaves the Court with an incomplete, and thus inaccurate, test.
As the State explains in its opening brief, Aplt.Brf. 23, the United
II

States Supreme Court in Fields held that the freedom-of-movement inquiry" is only ~al£ the test: "Not all restraints on freedom of movement
amount to custody for purposes of Miranda." 132 S.Ct. at 1189-90. Restricting a suspect' s freedom of movement is "' only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody."' Id. at 1190 (quoting Maryland v.

Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)). If a court finds that a suspect's freedom of
movement was restricted, it must then decide "whether the relevant environment present[ed] the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
station house questioning at issue in Miranda." Id. at 1189-90. As explained
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in the State's opening brief, neither part of the custody test was met here.

See Aplt.Brf. 22-28.
Relevant factors in determining whether a suspect' s freedom of
moven1ent is restricted "include the location of the questioning, its duration,
statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical
restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the
end of the questioning." Fields, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 (internal citations omitted).
Defendant was no doubt the focus of questioning at the station house,
which factors in favor of a finding that his freedom of movement was restricted. But that has never been enough for such a finding. See Aplt.Brf. 2425; California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) ("Miranda warnings are

not required 'simply because t~e questioning takes place in the station
house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect' ~')
(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). The remaining factors in this case weigh against a finding of custody. See Aplt.Brf. 24-28. Significantly, Defendant returned home after both interviews, just as the offic. ers s~id he would. R1150:if8, ?E3 (1:08-1:09); R11_48:'if7, SE4 (6:20, 1:09, 1:12,
2:52).

Nor did the environment present "the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda." Fields,

-6-

132 S.Ct. at 1189-90. Even if restrained, a suspect is not in custody for Mi-

randa purposes unless "there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement ' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Beheler, 463 U.S.
at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). "In the paradigmatic Miranda
situation- a person is arrested in his home or on the street and whisked to a
police station for questioning-detention represents a sharp and ominous
change, and the shock may give rise to coercive pressures." Fields, 132 S.Ct.
at 1190. But this is not a case where a suspect is "yanked" from his home
and hauled into the police station for questioning. See Fields, 132 S.Ct. at
1191. Defendant came to the station house of his own will and left after both
interviews-not like the four cases at issue in Miranda, where the suspect
was arrested or hauled off by police and never allowed to leave the station
house afterward. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-98.
Defendant argues that the fact officers read Defendant his Miranda
rights before the first interview, and referenced them in the second interv~ew, also weighs in favor of the trial court's finding of custody. Aple.Brf.
17-18. He contends that the mere giving of a Miranda warning suggests to
the suspect that he is in custody, since Miranda warnings "are prevalently
associated in the popular mind with arrest." Aple.Brf. 18. But Defendant
cites to nothing in support of that assertion. And nothing in the Miranda
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warning itself suggests that it need only be read ~hen a suspect is arrested.
Moreover, holding that an officer's reading of the Miranda warning supports a finding of custody would.be counterproductive, discouraging police
from reading suspects their rights. Although reading the Miranda warning is
only required before custodial interrogations, the rights discussed in the
warning apply whether or not someone is in custody. If reading the Miranda
warning is suggestive of custody, officers may be reluctant to read them
generally for fear that it will turn an otherwise noncustodial interview into a
custodial interview. Indeed, Detective Metcalf doubted that he needed to
read the Miranda warning, SE3 (4:30-5:02), but did anyway. This should be
encouraged, not discouraged.

II.
Evidence that Defendant hated the baby and treated
him roughly was admissible rule 404(b) evidence and
that evidence was not unfairly prejudicial under rule
403
The trial court ex~luded testimony that Defendant was jealous of G. B.
and that he called G.B. a whiner, flipped G.B. off, yelled at G.B., and inflicted injury on G.B. R1163-69. For the reasons explained in the State's opening
brief, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding that e~idence. See
Aplt.Brf. 38-51. But tw~ claims made by Defendant in his brief merit further
response: (1) that the trial court excluded testimony of him flipping off the
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baby under evidence rule 104, Aple.Brf. 32-33; and (2) that the State did not
challenge the basis for the trial court's exclusion of the mother's testimony
that Defendant was jealous of G.B., Aple.Brf. 34.
A. The trial court did not rely on evidence rule 104 in
excluding the testimony that Defendant flipped off
the baby.
Defendant argues that the trial court "[a]pparently ... did not believe
that the evidence. was strong ··enough" to prove that Defendant flipped off
G.B. and thus excluded it under evidence rule 104. Aple.Brf. 32-33. "When
the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist." Utah R.
Evid. 104(b). But Defendant did not challenge the evidence on this ground
and the trial court did not deem it inadmissible on that ground.
A trial court can exclude evidence under rule 104 only if it finds that
"there is [in]sufficient evidence upon which the jury could make such a determination." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,I19, 328 P.3d 841 (emphasis added). The mother testified that through the reflection in their fish tank, she
saw Defendant flip the baby off with both hands during an argument on
January 13, 2013. R1205:46. That testimony was sufficient to submit the matter to the jury to determine that fact, and the trial court did not suggest otherwise. Nor could the court have properly done so-" 'the trial court neither
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weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the
conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.'" Lucero, 2014 UT. 15,
if19 (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988)). 1
An examination of the trial court's ruling reveals that it excluded the
evidence under rule 403, not rule 104 or rule 404(b). The trial court ruled
that the flipping-off incident was "offered for a proper non-character purpose- to show that the Defendant had contempt for [G.B.]." R1167. But the
court then ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under rule 403. The
court concluded that the "probative value of this evidence is thin" and that
"the strength of the evidence is lacking." R1167. But the trial court here was
not making a ruling under rule 104. The court was conducting the rule 403
analysis it had described earlier in its opinion, i.e., whether the evidence's
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" in light of the "Shickles" factor concerning "the strength of the evidence." Rl 172. For all the reasons discussed in the State's opening brief, the
court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence under rule 403. See
ApH.Brf. 48-51.

In the court's findings of fact in its rule 404(b) ruling, the trial court
in fact found that during the January 13, 2013 argument, "Defendant flipped
off [the baby] with both hands" and that the mother "witnessed" it
"through the reflection in the fish tank." R1174.
1
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B. The State has challenged the basis of the trial court's
ruling excluding the mother's testimony that Defendant was.jealous of the baby.
Defendant claims that the State failed to analyze the tri~l court's rule
701 analysis of the mother's testimony that Defendant was jealous of G.B.
Aple.Brf. 34. He is mistaken.
The trial court ruled that to be admissible under rule 701, the mother's lay opinion that Defendant was jealous of G.B. "must be 'rationally
based on the witness's perception' and 'helpful ... to determining a fact in
issue.'" R1166 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 701(a)-(b)). The court concluded that
the mother's opinion was, in fact, "rationally based on the facts she observed." R1165. And the State does not take issue with that conclusion. 2 But
the trial court went on to conclude that the mother's opinion "would r:i,ot be
helpful to the trier of fact'' because Defendant's jealousy II does not suggest a
deep-seated envy that would motivate Defendant to commit a violent act
against" G.B. R1165. The State has challenged that conclusion.
Both rules 701 and 702 require a showing of helpfulness before opinion testimony-whether lay or expert-may be admitted. See Utah R. Evid.
701-02. As explained by the Tenth Circuit, "'this [helpfulness] condition·
goes primarily to relevance' because '[opinion] testimony which does not
Nor does the State take issue with the trial court's conclusion that
the proffered testimony is not bad acts evidence under rule 404(b). R1166.
2
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relate to any issue in the case is not r~levant and, ergo, non-helpful.'" United

States v. Gutierrez de Lopez, 761 F.3d 1123, 1136 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (discussing Fed. R. Evid. 702). And this is precisely what the State has
argued in its opening brief. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the mother's
II

testimony that Defendant was jealous of D.B. ''is relevant" because it helps
establish [Defendant's] contempt for G.B., thereby (1) showing that he had a
motive to hurt him, and (2) refuting [Defendant's] claim that the baby's injuries were accidentally inflicted." Aple.Brf. 47 n.1 (emphasis added).
The trial court concluded that the evidence did not show that DeII

fendant's jealousy was so deep-seated" that it "would motivate Defendant
to commit a violent act against" G.B. R1165. But that is for the jury to decide, not the trial judge. As explained in the State's opening brief, the jury
was entitled to examine all of this evidence to decide whether Defendant's
contempt and jealousy was sufficient to motivate him to harm G.B. The
"more reasons" Defendant had to harm G.B., "the more plausible was the
State's theory that he did so intentionally rather than recklessly" or by accident. State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Utah 1997).
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C. This Court's rule 403 analysis is more fully governed
by the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in State
v. Cuttler.
Defendant argues that the State's discussion of rule 403 "shoots wide
of the trial court's ruling, because the trial court excluded the 404(b) evidence on the ground of a lack of proper non-character purpose, and not on
403 grounds." Aple.Brf. 38. But as explained in the State's opening brief, the
trial court concluded that the "flipping off" and "whiner" evidence was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose. Aplt.Brf. 44. But it then ruled that
such evidence, together with the prior abuse evidence, was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. R1164,1167-69. For the reasons explained in the State's brief, the trial court abused its discretion in so
ruling. Aplt.Brf. 47-51. 3
Since the filing of the State's brief, the Utah Supreme Court further
clarified rule 403 analysis in State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95,367 P.3d 981. There,
the Court held that "it is inappropriate for a district court to ever consider
whether evidence will lead a jury to 'overmastering hostility''' Id. at

3

if 20.

Defendant argues that the bruising to G.B.'s cheeks resulting from
Defendant administering· medicine is not sufficiently similar to the alleged
abuse here. Aple.Brf. 38. But Defendant, like the trial court, seeks to impose
a much harsher burden than is required to show the probative value of such
evidence. Neither administering medicine, nor putting a baby to bed,
should result in the injuries suffered by G.B. The evidence is thus highly
probative that Defendant intentionally inflicted injury upon G.B.
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The Court explained that "[o]vermastering hostility is both a stricter and
looser metric by-which to judge evidence under rule 403." Id. On the one
hartd, evidence·may be unfairly prejudicial "in ways other than by rousing a
jury to overmastering hostility," and on the other hand, "overmastering
hostility is much stronger language than the 'unfair' language actually used
in rule 403." Id. Accordingly, evidence is properly examined" 'by the text of
rule 403,'" id. at 118 (quoting Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,I32)~i.e., whether the evidence's "propative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
... -unfair prejudice" or other rule 403 concern. Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis
added).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the State's opening
brief, the Court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted on May 5, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellant
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